EU involvement in the South Caucasus: dynamics of democratic transition in Georgia and Azerbaijan by Shafagatov, Ramin
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU involvement in the South Caucasus: Dynamics of democratic 
transition in Georgia and Azerbaijan    
 
Paper presented at the  
EUSA 12th Biennial International Conference  
Boston/Massachusetts, USA  
3-5 March, 2011 
 
 
Zero draft - Research in progress 
Not to be cited without permission, thank you! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ramin Shafagatov  
PhD candidate in EU Studies   
Department of Political Science - Centre for EU-Studies  
Ghent University - A Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence 
Universiteitstraat 8   
B-9000 Ghent, Belgium  
Tel: +32 9 264 97 62 
Fax: +32 9 264 67 09  
E-mail: ramin.shafagatov@ugent.be  
Web: http://www.eustudies.ugent.be  
 
2 
 
Introduction 
In 2004 both Georgia and Azerbaijan joined the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) framework. The years before the societies of the respective 
countries experienced dramatic changes caused by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union… EU have concentrated on the democratization process in the South 
Caucasus only following the independence of those countries in 1991.  
The EU relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan have been based on 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) which date back to 1999. 
The set of instruments at the EU’s disposal subsequently expanded from mere 
technical assistance at the beginning of the 1990’s into the comprehensive 
foreign policy toolkit a decade later (Börzel et al. 2009). This relationship has 
gained new momentum since the Rose Revolution which resulted a year later 
in incorporation of those countries into the ENP which is a more 
comprehensive, novel and forward-looking framework aimed to promote 
political and economic reform (Ferrero-Valdner, 2007).    
Georgia and Azerbaijan are the critical cases to compare in terms of their 
transition to liberal democracy. Living its second decade of independence 
after the disintegration of the USSR, the challenging countries of this complex 
region today are in direct neighbourhood with the EU. Even though they 
shared the same path until 2003, they constitute most different cases with 
regard to the dimension of democracy and good governance (Börzel et al. 
2009). 
In line with the analytical framework in this paper I will engage in a three-
part consideration of the democratic challenges in “cooperation-willing” 
Georgia and “cooperation-reluctant” Azerbaijan (Franke et al. 2010). By 
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drawing on the ENP, which is the main reform tool in the region, the paper 
will examine the influence of this policy instrument, in particular of the 
Eastern Partnership on the democratic transition of Georgia and Azerbaijan 
by focusing on below-mentioned components: the combat against corruption, 
the violation of human rights as well as conflict resolution. First, the study 
will consult to the democratic history of both countries by considering the fact 
that the post-Soviet Georgian (before the Rose Revolution) corruption 
environment is still reality in Azerbaijan, - in a country once upon a time 
being the first democratic republic in the East of 1918. It will further analyze 
that in contrast with Georgia, the Azeri experience demonstrates a reverse 
trajectory of transition: not from authoritarianism to democracy but from a 
democracy-oriented rule to authoritarianism referring to a one-year 
democratic experiment of Elçibey’s government of 1992-93 (Guliyev 2005). 
Accordingly, the situation of human rights in a comparative perspective will 
be deliberated as well. Next, since the both countries are suffering from the 
ongoing conflicts, the elements on which level the EU’s role in the conflict 
resolution should be, are also considered. Consequently, while in the EU it is 
very much believed that democratization is a panacea to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict (between Armenia and Azerbaijan), the incumbent 
government of Azerbaijan considers it the other way round, conflict being as a 
hindrance to democratization in the country, which is not the case in Georgia.  
So, why does the EU have an influence in Georgia despite the absence of a 
membership perspective which is usually considered to be essential? Why the 
similar incentives under the same policy instrument (ENP) are “enough” for 
Georgia to induce domestic reforms in the fields of governance and 
democracy, but doesn’t work on Azerbaijan? Why is the EU’s “soft power” 
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doesn’t work on Azerbaijan? To what extent Azerbaijan matters to the EU? 
What stands beyond Azerbaijani reluctance to integrate?   
 
In this respect, the projected study will seek to explore and hypothesize, as 
one of those possible obstacles, that in Georgia economic development is an 
opportunity to foster democracy while in Azerbaijan it is rather an 
impediment. Finally, the case studies of these two dissimilar countries will 
allow me to test main implications of the ENP in several dimension of 
cooperation in order to draw profound conclusions about EU strategy 
towards its troubled neighbors.   
 
Economy is a key, democracy is a tool?  
EU’s ‘traditional’ cautious approach.                                                                  
 
ENP is a major policy instrument which associates Georgia and Azerbaijan 
with the EU. It incorporate a set of dimensions one of which is democracy 
promotion. To start with, democracy promotion in neighboring countries is 
assumed to stabilize the EU’s external borders. The EU was and is spending 
large sums on democracy promotion and human rights protection. The EU’s 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights for the years 2007-2013 
receives an allocation from the central budget of 1 billion euros, which makes 
the EU financially one of the biggest donors in this sector in the world. The 
promotion of democracy and human rights thereby also serve geo-strategic 
interests since the EU’s borders are assumed to be more stable with 
democracy and human rights spreading (Brosig, 2010:43-44).  
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For most EU claiming to act in the name of democracy goals but actually 
intent on boosting its own power or protecting its own interests. It’s an 
important element of EU’s strategic calculations. Protecting its strategic 
interests is possibly a natural right of any party (in this case EU) unless it 
prevails the basic values prescribed on EU’s foundations. On the other hand, 
as Karin Arts notes that ‘there is neither a well-established rule or general 
principle of international law prescribing an individual or collective right to 
democracy  nor an absolute duty of states or governments to be democratic’ 
although the essentials of democracy have been incorporated into human 
rights law. Moreover, there is an apparent discrepancy between internal 
Union practice and external policy objectives, which helps neither to adopt a 
clear strategy for achieving the objectives nor to foster external perceptions 
that the Union can legitimately demand that third countries improve their 
democratic and governance records (Smith, 2008).  
Subsequently, the extent of EU dependence on third world countries (i.e. 
Azerbaijan) in material resources is affecting EU policy-making. Instead of 
openly criticizing democratic shortcomings, they reward progress of 
cooperation and reform.  As EU commissioner once made it clear, if there are 
reforms we financially do support them if not we do nothing.1 Roman Prodi, 
in his speech at the 6th ECSA World Conference in Brussels (2002) declared 
that ‘We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than 
membership, without precluding the latter’. What stands beyond this is pretty 
much unclear. But noticeably, the EU is using its political weight in 
international relations and its financial means to promote and enforce human 
rights norms globally.  
                                                          
1
 Personal interview at the EU Commission in Brussels, 12.05.2010 
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Then again, it is no longer able to justify aid expenditure as necessary for geo-
strategic objectives, donors have to justify it on other grounds, which resonate 
with domestic publics. Thus, they assert that aid should go to democracies 
rather than corrupt and autocratic regimes. However, the EU is the only 
regional organization in Europe that can combine political influence with real 
economic incentives (Galbreath & Gebhard 2010:172).  
Of not less important is that it must be made clear that democracy is much 
more about than elections. EU’s observatory missions regularly following the 
elections in the respective countries is certainly necessary but not enough. On 
the other hand, you cannot always expect somebody else to come from 
outside and resolve your problems. The promising revolutions in Tunisia and 
Egypt proved it by and large. That sort of indolence will not get you very far. 
If you do not focus on specific tasks such as meeting the requirements for the 
visa free regime and the priorities set forth by the European Partnership, 
nobody from the outside can do anything about it (McEvoy, 2010:133). It is 
already very much believed that human rights and democracy promoter 
(European Union) referring usually to the human rights and democracy 
producer (Council of Europe) are going to tolerate democratic wrongdoers for 
indefinite period.    
 
Georgia: The Pursuit of Democracy  
Georgia will easily overcome the economic problems stemming from its withdrawal 
from the USSR. We will join (the EEC) European Union. This statement has been 
made by the Georgian official in 1990. On the whole, it showed the Georgian 
aspirations towards integration which is a positive sign of ENP partner 
country.  
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Following on from the EU-Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 
the ENP Action Plan was adopted by the Georgian government in 2006. The 
Action Plan set targets for reform for the years 2006-2011 in a wide range of 
areas. Georgia’s reform agenda is closely connected to its European and Euro-
Atlantic aspirations. The reforms aim to push Georgia towards a more 
democratic and lawful society, to align the Georgian economy and legal 
system with European and international standards, and to make Georgia a 
better neighbour, and a more likely future member, of the EU.  
Bilateral relations between EU and Georgia have further intensified since the 
2003 "rose revolution" which brought to power a new Georgian 
administration committed to an ambitious programme of political and 
economic reforms. Saakashvili administration has managed to achieve 
remarkable advances in combating corruption. Since the Rose Revolution 
Georgia performs better, although on a comparatively low level. Some 
progress has been made but important ones are still have to be made.  
Table 1: Level of corruption in Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999/2004/2010 
 Year Ranking 
 
Score 
 
Georgia 1999 84 2.3 
 2004 133 2.0 
 2010 68 3.8 
    
Azerbaijan 1999 96 1.7 
 2004 140 1.9 
 2010 158 1.9 
Source: Transparency International.   
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Not less important is the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from 
Georgian territory. Among others are: a new opposition party is formed, a 
new law on media transparency is proposed, parliament approved changes to 
the constitution which limits presidential rights and giving more power to the 
parliament, as well as visa-free travel for North Caucasus citizens is 
introduced.    
 
Hereditary ‘Democracy’: Azerbaijan 
In 1918 the political world map ‘welcomed’ the first democratic republic in the 
East: Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR). Today Azerbaijan is in the top 
of authoritarianism and appears to be in most urgent need for improving 
governance. While Georgia has made some progress Azerbaijan appears to be 
“stuck in transition” (Börzel et al. 2009).     
Syria and North Korea ….  
The EU’s relations with Azerbaijan are a primary example of how 
considerations of democracy have been downplayed. Azerbaijan, through its 
natural resources and conditions, is considered to be the wealthiest country in 
South Caucasus and, if measured by its GDP growth rate, unsurprisingly can 
claim to be the richest in the world, mostly because of its energy supplies. But 
as regards to democracy the situation is far more nuanced. Therefore many 
EU member states have simply been unwilling to put any pressure on 
Azerbaijan to conform to democracy and human rights standards. What 
makes the two relations risky is the lack of Azerbaijani aspirations. Because 
dialogue will only work if the third country is ready to cooperate and is 
genuinely committed to pursuing change. Azerbaijan however is not very 
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much interested in integrating into the Euro-structures. Even Foreign Minister 
of Azerbaijan once made it clear that Azerbaijan wants to be like Switzerland 
of Europe, implying to politically staying away from EU but economically 
cooperating, though Switzerland is a modern democracy. Following Franke et 
al. (2010), by considering reflections of the democratic challenges in 
“cooperation-willing” Georgia (re-modified from Ukraine due to relative 
similarity) and “cooperation-reluctant” Azerbaijan I want to add that 
Azerbaijan is not totally reluctant, it is economically motivated but politically 
reluctant.   
Table 2: Level of press freedom in Georgia and Azerbaijan in 1999/2004/2010 
 Year Ranking  
 
Rating 
 
Status 
Georgia 1999 - -  -  
2004 114 54 Partly Free 
2010 126 59 Partly Free 
     
Azerbaijan 1999 - - - 
2004 156 71 Not free 
2010 172 79 Not Free  
 
Source: Freedom House.   
There is in fact a skepticism and according to Franke et al. (2010), it is largely 
based on the misfit between ENP demands and rewards. But it is less likely to 
be a reason for Azeri reluctance. Georgian case as a frontrunner however 
proved it that strong political will by reform-willing assertiveness and 
‘impatience’ to move forward is essential for successful cooperation.  
Another important issue is, while Azerbaijan is experiencing one of the 
dangerous turn-point in its democratization history, its obligations on EU 
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partnership agreements, in particular within the frameworks of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), have not been fulfilled yet and pessimistically 
seems to stay on paper for a long time due to the current trends happening in 
the country’s political arena (Shafagatov, 2010). Accordingly, The history has 
recorded this rich-but-poor country, rich in energy but poor in democracy, as 
authoritarian since its parliament has taken steps to eliminate presidential 
term limits which is considered to be a huge step back in terms of democracy 
according to local analysts. Interestingly, the proposed constitutional change 
has passed through the parliamentary commissions, general parliament vote, 
and constitution court’s approval in less than ten days with no public debate 
on the issue. Consequently, as it was expected, the Constitutional Court on 
December 24, 2008 ruled to allow a referendum in which the possibility of 
unlimited presidential terms would be put to the public and the parliament, 
dominated by pro-government parties, overwhelmingly confirmed the date 
scheduled on March 18, 2009. The proposed constitutional amendment has 
been widely criticized by opposition parties, though. In spite of attempted 
demonstrations protesting against the amendment, police over-managed to 
break it up instantly. According to Ali Kerimli, previous elections were 
falsified, and all levels of the election commissions are under the control of the 
government. So the upcoming plebiscite will be falsified as well, considers the 
chairman of the Popular Front Party. Meanwhile, civic activists consider the 
proposed amendment contradicts the fundamental nature of the country. 
Taking into account the circumstances of the society, the lack of political 
freedoms, the lack of a legitimate process of elections, and the lack of free 
media and a free market – if you take them altogether, removing the 
constitutional clause which limits the number of presidential terms would 
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eventually lead to some sort of monarchy-like state. On January 1, 2009 the 
Azerbaijani government terminated radio broadcasts of the BBC, Voice of 
America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on the national frequencies. An 
embarrassed ban on broadcasting of international radio stations as an 
argument was supported by the requirements of the current legislation, 
though it was a political decision. A cutting off one of the last remaining 
sources of independent news and information in Azerbaijan in the XXI 
century is a ‘courageous’ step enough which will certainly take the country 
into the Soviet period. The parliamentary elections in 2010 recorded the worst 
elections ever simply because there was in fact no opposition represented in 
Milli Mejlis. The fraudulent elections is also followed by recently arresting the 
leadership of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan which is another example of 
negative trend.  
 
Comparatively, in the light of Georgian president’s recent initiative to limit 
the presidential rights in Georgia and instead giving more power to the 
parliament, the proposed constitutional amendment and a ridiculously 
justified ban on broadcasting of the major international radio stations in 
Azerbaijan looks quite unreasonable and bizarre.  
Therefore, it gives us an impulse to believe that the government is guilty of 
stifling democracy and freedom of speech by violating its international 
obligations and in this case one can unquestionably argue that President 
Aliyev is an office-seeking politician who is trying to manipulate economic 
policy to increase his chances of being re-elected. A question might arise: Why 
the incumbent government doesn’t take corrective action??? 
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However the establishment of the Commission on Combating Corruption of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan is an essential step forward. Now it is of vital 
importance to make it work efficiently. As a whole, there are more or less a 
legislative basis for the implementation of the reforms, most of them either not 
working or being regularly violated. Following the uprising in the Arab world 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and a few others) in the early 2011 Azerbaijani 
authorities officially declared anti-corruption ‘campaign’ in the country, 
apparently, in order to prevent the possible negative influence from the 
African revolutions. These are called anti-revolutionary measures by the 
opposition implying that the government is not sincere in its deeds.  
 
 
Conflict Resolution   
South Caucasus is not only rich in oil and gas resources but also full of thorny 
conflicts prevailing in the region for decades. After the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union violent conflicts erupted in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Though 
they had been different by nature the violence in both were on its peak. A 
territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh 
which broke out in 1988 is still unresolved due to ongoing ineffective 
negotiations. Another separatist conflict in nature is Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. What is clear is that in both cases Russian ‘invisible’ but unwanted 
hand is present. Its dominance and direct support of separatists is a logical 
consequence of deadlocked conflicts in the region. Accordingly, it also puts 
the EU face-to-face with Russia and the respective countries with two 
different foreign policy choices.   
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The EU is more active in the field of post-conflict activities rather than being 
involved in conflict resolution. Also, the OSCE has developed into an 
organization highly specialized in conflict prevention though its continuing 
incapability in those conflicts. According to Richard Burchill, one 
commentator has described the OSCE as a ‘playground’ for the EU to 
experiment with its foreign relation policies and peace and security initiatives. 
However, the Russian-Georgian clash in 2008 was a haunting reminder of 
how quick ‘frozen’ conflicts can become hot (Galbreath & Gebhard 2010:177). 
It certainly changed a lot in political landscape of the region. Most 
importantly, it was a clear signal of Russia to the neighboring countries to be 
cautious in their conducts.  
The Union’s efforts to prevent conflicts in and between third countries are 
based in part on the belief that lack of good governance and respect for 
human rights are causes of conflicts, and that support for democracy should 
help prevent conflicts (Smith, 2008). Azerbaijan in contrast considers it the 
other way round, conflict being as a hindrance to democratization in the 
country. Overall, we can see that there are elements of truth in both cases 
which is difficult to judge. But it gives us to speculate that the government 
using the conflict as an excuse. Because whenever there is a demand for real 
political reforms, e.g., freedom of gathering, press freedom, judicial reforms, 
human rights violations and not less important combating corruption, the 
incumbent government ask for taking a solid stance in conflict resolution.  
Civil societies of both conflicting countries however consider that a major key 
for the resolution of the long-standing conflicts goes through the 
democratization. Because it is very much easier to communicate with each 
other when the countries are free from oppression and there exist a 
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considerable level of freedom. While Georgia is on its way to achieve such 
freedoms Azerbaijan is still in the dark tunnel with no green light ahead. It 
must be made clear to Azerbaijani government that democratic wrongdoers 
cannot be tolerated ever and should be punished like Belarus gets such a 
punishment from the EU. Azerbaijan ‘deserves’ similar punishment certainly 
not less than Belarus.   
 
Conclusion  
The ‘one size fits all’ approach that has evolved at the regional level sets the 
institutional framework within which the EU seeks to promote democracy in 
the South Caucasus (Börzel et al. 2009). Although the South Caucasus is 
referred to as ‘region’ in relations with foreign actors, none of the latter 
cooperates with the three countries as a region; rather, each of the 
international actors, including the EU, has different relations and cooperation 
level with each of the countries (Gazaryan, 2010). Apparently, ‘one size fits all’ 
approach is less likely to work in this volatile region. It would be more 
relevant to give each what they deserve, carrot (reward) to Georgia, stick 
(punishment) to Azerbaijan.   
According to Franke et al., the success of any EU strategy depends on three 
factors: 
- The willingness of an ENP partner country to cooperate; 
- The asymmetric interdependence between the EU and an ENP partner 
country; 
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- Adaptation costs of EU demands that are linked to the continuation of 
path-dependent, persisting Soviet-era mentalities and a particular type 
of incumbent regime in an ENP partner country 
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